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NOTE
THE POST-EMPLOYMENT COVENANT NOT TO
COMPETE: AN OLD DOG DOING A NEW TRICK
Patrick R. Watt
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984 the public accounting firm of Dobbins, Deguire and
Tucker, P.C. (hereinafter Dobbins), filed suit in Missoula County
against three of its former employees alleging that each of the for-
mer employees had violated their employment contracts with Dob-
bins.1 The contract required each employee to pay Dobbins a fee if
the employee obtained a Dobbins' client within twelve months af-
ter their employment with Dobbins ceased.2 The amount of the fee
was to equal 100 percent of the gross fees billed by Dobbins to the
obtained customer, over the twelve-month period preceding the
employee's termination. Additionally, the employees were to pay
the fee in "monthly installments over a three year period" with
interest accruing at 8 percent per annum.4
Upon motion by the defense, the trial court dismissed the suit
for failure to state sufficient facts upon which relief could be
granted.3 The trial court ruled that the payment terms Dobbins
sought to enforce were void as a matter of law under section 28-2-
703 of the Montana Code Annotated.6 Specifically, the liquidated
damages clause was found to constitute a penalty for breach of the
employment agreement and thus was in restraint of trade.
1. Dobbins, Deguire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, __ Mont .... 708 P.2d
577, 578 (1985).
2. Id. at , 708 P.2d at 578.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at -, 708 P.2d at 578-79. (MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (1987) was previously
enacted as Sec. 2246, Civ. C. 1895; re-enacted as Sec. 5057, Rev. C. 1907; re-enacted as Sec.
7559, R.C.M. 1921; re-enacted as Sec. 7559, R.C.M. 1935; re-enacted as R.C.M. 1947, 13-807.)
7. Appellant's Opening Brief at A-2, Dobbins, - Mont. -, 708 P.2d 577 (1985),
Memorandum and Order of the lower court (available at the Montana State Law Library in
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On appeal by the plaintiff, a unanimous Montana Supreme
Court reversed the holding of the lower court and remanded the
case for further proceedings.8 In doing so, the court announced
that post-employment restraints that meet a test of reasonable-
ness9 are enforceable. Furthermore, the court limited its holding in
an earlier case that appeared to have been controlling 1° and seem-
ingly read new exceptions into the time tested section 28-2-703."
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Dobbins opened a
Pandora's box of legal issues concerning the post-employment re-
straints placed on employees under employment contracts. This
note will explore the effects the holding in Dobbins may have on
employer-employee relationships in Montana and factors practi-
tioners should consider when drafting or litigating a Dobbins type
restraint. However, to provide an understanding of the possible
ramifications of the Dobbins case, this note will initially review rel-
evant decisions that preceded Dobbins.
II. HISTORY
In 18951" Montana codified the public policy that declared un-
enforceable those contracts which restrained trade. Is In doing so,
Montana joined with the minority of states having codified this
policy.'4 The language adopted in 1895 remains intact today, codi-
fied as section 28-2-703 which provides that "[a]ny contract by
which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind, otherwise than is provided for.., is
Helena, Montana).
8. Dobbins, - Mont. at __, 708 P.2d at 580.
9. Id. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
10. J. T. Miller Co. v. Madel, 176 Mont. 49, 575 P.2d 1321 (1978); see infra notes 53-
54 and accompanying text.
11. Dobbins, - Mont. at __, 708 P.2d at 759; for a listing of cases construing this
statute see infra note 19.
12. Before this time, Montana had adopted the common-law rule that "contracts in
restrain[t] of trade, generally, have been held to be void; while those limited as to time or
place or persons have been regarded as valid, and duly enforced." Newell v. Meyendorff, 9
Mont. 254, 260, 23 P. 333, 334 (1890) (quoting Alger v. Thatcher, 19 Pick. 51 (1837)).
13. Currently codified as MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (1987). See supra note 6 for
prior codification. (The language was adopted from CAL. Civ. C. Sec. 1673; FIELD Civ. C. Sec.
833).
14. See Comment, Covenant not to Compete: A Survey of Kansas and Missouri Law,
53 UMKC L. REV. 237, n.100 (1985) (citing ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1975); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 16600-02 (West 1964); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113-(2), (3) (1973 & Supp. 1982); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 480-4 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1964); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§
445.761, 445.766 (1948); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217-19
(West 1966); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8 to -11 (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465
(West 1974).
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to that extent void."
Two exceptions to the statutory general rule are found in its
companion sections which allow for various restraints on trade as-
sociated with the sale of goodwill of a business"5 and upon dissolu-
tion of a partnership." From 1895 until today, 7 Montana statutes
have authorized only those two exceptions."
Since the adoption of section 28-2-703, the Montana courts
have seldom had occasion to void contractual attempts to restrain
trade. 9 However, in the three instances prior to Dobbins when the
court construed the validity of post-employment restraints on for-
mer employees, the court invalidated such attempts.2 0
In Best Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Houchen,2" the Montana Su-
preme Court first considered the validity of an employer's attempt
to restrain a former employee from engaging in competition. The
plaintiff in Houchen, a milk products distributor, sought to enjoin
its former salesperson from soliciting route customers whom the
salesperson had served as its employee. 2  Although the employ-
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-704(1987) provides:
(1) One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to re-
frain from carrying on a similar business within the areas provided in subsection
(2) so long as the buyer or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him
carries on a like business therein.
(2) The agreement authorized in subsection (1) may apply in:
(a) the city where the principal office of the business is located;
(b) the county where the principal office of the business is located;
(c) a city in any county adjacent to the county in which the principal office of
the business is located;
(d) any county adjacent to the county in which the principal office of the
business is located; or
(e) any combination of the foregoing.
16. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-705 (1987) states: "Partners may, upon dissolution of a
partnership, agree that one or more of them may not carry on a similar business within the
areas provided in 28-2-704(2)."
17. In 1983, the legislature enlarged the geographical area in which a qualifying party
could protect their interest from competition to include adjacent counties. Act of 1983, 1983
Mont. Laws 432, § 2 (codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-704(2)(c), (d), (e)
(1987).
18. J. T. Miller Co. v. Madel, 176 Mont. 49, 52-53, 575 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1978).
19. First Am. Ins. Agency v. Gould, 203 Mont. 217, 661 P.2d 451 (1983) (covenants
prohibiting employee from utilizing experience obtained through employment constituted
an unlawful restraint on trade); Lar-Con Corp. v. Murman Properties, Ltd., 188 Mont. 183,
612 P.2d 676 (1980) (covenant not to compete upon sale of goodwill of a business prescribed
area greater than that allowed under MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-704 and thus was void); J.T.
Miller Co. v. Madel, 176 Mont. 49, 575 P.2d 1321 (1978) (covenant prohibiting employee
from competing with employer was not enforceable); Wylie v. Wylie Permanent Camping
Co., 57 Mont. 115, 187 P. 279 (1920) (seller of corporate stock had no interest in goodwill of
business and thus could not be restrained from competition).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 21-51.
21. 152 Mont. 194, 448 P.2d 158 (1968).
22. Id. at 195-97, 448 P.2d at 159-60.
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ment contract between the parties was silent as to restrictions on
post-employment solicitation of former route customers, the plain-
tiff-employer claimed that the defendant-employee breached his
duty not to disclose confidential information he had obtained while
in service of the employer. 2 The lower court rejected the em-
ployer's claim and rendered judgment for the defendant.24
In resolving the controversy, the court recognized that an em-
ployee may owe his former employer a duty not to disclose or use
confidential information belonging to the employer.25 However,
this duty is an exception to the general rule. 6 It arises only when
the information is confidential and is not readily accessible to the
competition. 7 Thus, the court found that the duty did not apply
to the facts before it. The central factor in the court's determina-
tion was that the "customer's names and addresses . . . [were]
readily accessible to anyone," and thus the employee lacked knowl-
edge of any information that would afford the employer such
protection. a
In 1978, in J.T. Miller Co. v. Madel,29 the court dealt with the
question of whether an employment contract which prohibited an
insurance salesman from soliciting customers of his former em-
ployer for five years was void as a restraint of trade under section
28-2-703.30 The plaintiffs operated and managed a general insur-
ance agency in Minnesota and employed the defendant, pursuant
to an employment contract, as a field agent to sell credit life insur-
ance to banking institutions. In 1975 the insurance agency trans-
ferred the agent to Montana. One year later, the agent resigned his
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 198-99, 448 P.2d at 160-61. The court explained that the employee's duty
not to disclose confidential information descends from two sources. The first is the em-
ployer's property right to everything acquired by the employee through his employment.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-102 (1987). The second is the common-law duty owed by an agent
to principal: "[Tihe agent has a duty ... not to use or disclose . . . trade secrets, written
lists of names, or other similar confidential matters .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 396 (1957).
26. Id. at 199, 448 P.2d at 161. The court noted that "it is the general rule that in the
absence of an express contract forbidding solicitation of a former employer's customers, an
employee ... may solicit the business of his former customers, and will not be enjoined from
such solicitation at the insistence of his former employer." (Citing with approval Annota-
tion, Right in Absence of Express Contract to Enjoin Former Employee From Soliciting
Complainants Customers, 126 A.L.R. 758, 770 (1940)).
27. Id.
28. Id. Such information did not constitute a property right or trade secret because
the information as to the identity of the customers was such "that anyone could easily as-
certain who was delivering milk to a certain customer." Id. at 198, 448 P.2d at 160.
29. 176 Mont. 49, 575 P.2d 1321 (1978).
30. Id. at 50-52, 575 P.2d at 1322-23.
[Vol. 49
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employment with the plaintiffs and "immediately commenced em-
ployment with a competing insurance company." 31 In response, the
agency filed suit in district court seeking to enjoin the "defendant
from contacting or soliciting any of plaintiffs' customers with
whom defendant had at any time dealt with on behalf of plain-
tiffs. '32 All told, the injunction would have precluded the former
agent from selling credit life insurance to twenty-four out of the
158 banks in Montana.3 3 Following a bench trial, the district court
held that the employment contract was void because it violated
public policy." On appeal before the Montana Supreme Court, the
agency argued that the statute was not an absolute prohibition on
restraints of trade, but allowed for reasonable restraints under the
circumstances surrounding each particular contract.35 Additionally,
the agency contended that the contractual restraints at issue
merely protected confidential information and thus were an excep-
tion under the holding in Houchen 6
In rejecting the employer's argument that the restraints were
reasonable and thus enforceable, the court mandated that strict
compliance with the statutory provisions was required for all cove-
nants incident to employment contracts.3 The court declared:
This court requires strict compliance with the statutory provi-
sions of ... [Montana Code Annotated section 28-2-703] and
companion sections .... [Montana Code Annotated sections 28-
2-704 and 28-2-705]. Plaintiffs' restrictive covenant, in their em-
ployment agreement, clearly does not qualify under either statu-
tory exception .... Accordingly, the directness of ... [Montana
Code Annotated section 28-2-703] in its structure and the broad-
ness of its terms commands the conclusion that it applies to the
facts of this case and prohibits the restraint asserted. 8
Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the restraints at issue were enforceable under the confidential in-
formation exception set forth in Houchen. The information used
by the employee to locate and solicit the business of his former
31. Id. at 51, 575 P.2d at 1322.
32. Id.
33. Appellant's Opening Brief at A-9, Madel, 176 Mont. 49, 575 P.2d 1321 (1978)
(available at the Montana State Law Library in Helena, Montana). The parties stipulated to
this number, which included only those banks the agent had previously contacted on behalf
of the agency.
34. Madel, 176 Mont. at 51, 575 P.2d at 1322. See also Appellant's Opening Brief,
Record at 5.
35. Madel, 176 Mont. at 52, 575 P.2d at 1323.
36. Id. at 53, 575 P.2d at 1323.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 52-53, 575 P.2d at 1323.
1988]
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employer's clients was well within the public domain 9 and thus
did not constitute confidential information that would demand ju-
dicial protection."' The court also explained the framework of the
confidential information protection permitted under Houchen. The
court stated that once section 28-2-703 was found to be applicable
law, the plaintiff bears the burden "to show that the restrictive
covenant did not violate this section. '41
The court faced a similar situation to that in Madel in First
American Ins. Agency v. Gould.42 The plaintiff in Gould, a Great
Falls insurance agency and former employer of the defendant,
sought to enjoin the defendant from selling insurance in the Great
Falls area.'" The agency employed the defendant for approxi-
mately two and one half years as an insurance sales representative
pursuant to an employment contract entered into at the inception
of the defendant's employment. The contract contained both a
covenant prohibiting competition within an area surrounding the
plaintiff's agency, and a covenant not to disclose information ob-
tained through the defendant's employment." Upon leaving her
employment, the defendant proceeded to open her own insurance
agency, locating it in the vicinity of the plaintiff's agency.' 5 More-
over, the defendant began soliciting business from customers to
whom the defendant had sold policies while employed by the
plaintiff." Consequently, the agency brought suit to enforce the
terms of the employment contract. 47 The trial court, however, de-
nied the agency a permanent injunction and held that, as a matter
of law, the covenants in the employment contract were void under
section 28-2-703."
On appeal, the agency argued for the enforcement of the cove-
nants at issue. The court, in separate treatments, found both cove-
nants to be unenforceable.' 9 More importantly however, the court
39. Id. at 54, 575 P.2d at 1323. ("[D]efendant did nothing more than to contact banks
which were obviously known and open to all vendors .... The knowledge of the banks was
clearly within the public domain.")
40. Id. at 55, 575 P.2d at 1324.
41. Id. at 53, 575 P.2d at 1323.
42. 203 Mont. 217, 661 P.2d 451 (1983).
43. Id. at 218-20, 661 P.2d at 452-53.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 220, 661 P.2d at 453.
46. Id. at 220-21, 661 P.2d at 453.
47. Id. at 220, 661 P.2d at 453.
48. Id. at 222, 661 P.2d at 453.
49. Id. at 223-24, 661 P.2d at 454. Initially, the court dismissed the issue of the cove-
nants not to compete as blatantly prohibited under MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-703 (1987).
Then, in a more thorough discussion, it held that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of
proving that the covenant not to disclose did not violate MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-703
358 [Vol. 49
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analyzed the legal framework supporting the Houchen exception to
section 28-2-703. This analysis centered on the proof a plaintiff
would need to meet the initial burden to overcome the provisions
of the statute. This burden, explained the court, could be met by
substantial credible evidence that the employee took property
from the employer 0 or violated the employer's confidence.0 1
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING IN Dobbins
In Dobbins, a unanimous Montana Supreme Court held that
the contract provisions that the plaintiff sought to enforce did "not
constitute a restraint of trade [as] prohibited by" section 28-2-
703.52 Furthermore, the court announced that the statute does not
prohibit reasonable covenants in employment contracts. The test
for reasonableness as set forth by the court requires: "(1) The cov-
enant should be limited in operation either as to time or place; (2)
the covenant should be based on some good consideration; and (3)
the covenant should afford a reasonable protection for and not im-
pose an unreasonable burden upon the employer, the employee, or
the public.' '5 The application of this test, said the court, "requires
a balancing of the competing interests of the public as well as the
employer and employee.""
Consequently, with its'declaration of the reasonableness stan-
dard, the court was forced to reexamine its holding in Madel. The
court recognized the conflict between the rule announced in Dob-
bins and that of Madel, stating: "[t]here are statements made in
Madel which are sufficiently broad to support the conclusion of the
district court that any type of a restriction upon the exercise of a
lawful profession must be invalidated." 55
Thus, the court construed its holding in Madel as being lim-
ited by the fact that "the covenant not to compete was, in effect,
an absolute prohibition upon ... engage[ment] in the business of
selling insurance. '" 6 The court additionally labeled the contract
measure in Madel as prohibiting the plaintiff from doing business
while the contract in Dobbins did not.
(1987).
50. Id. This property usually consists of records, lists of customers or other documents
belonging to the employer. See Houchen, 152 Mont. at 198, 448 P.2d at 161.
51. Id. (as where the employer can prove that the employee memorized privileged in-
formation and used or disclosed such information outside the scope of employment.)
52. Dobbins, - Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 580.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at __, 708 P.2d at 579.
56. Id.
19881 359
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING IN Dobbins
The court treated the reimbursement provision in the contract
between Dobbins and the former employees, as a restrictive cove-
nant. 7 However, instead of applying the strict compliance rule
found in Madel and applied by the district court, the court applied
a traditional "rule of reason" that allowed enforcement of the con-
tract.58 Although this approach seemingly reversed long professed
tenets of the court when construing section 28-2-703 and its prede-
cessors," the opposite is true.
In interpreting the statute, the court cited a 1979 restraint-of-
trade case testing the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in a
lease agreement.60 The court found the following factors essential
for a restrictive covenant to be reasonable and thus enforceable:
(1) it must be partial or restricted in its operation in respect to
either time or place; (2) it must be on some good consideration;
and (3) it must be reasonable, that is, it should afford only a fair
protection to the interests of the party in whose favor it is made,
and must not be so large in its operation as to interfere with the
interest of the public.6
Although the court in O'Neill and Dobbins borrowed the test for
reasonableness from other jurisdictions, Montana had long ago
adopted such a standard.
In 1912, in a case of first impression regarding the construc-
tion the court would place on the newly enacted section 28-2-703,
Justice Holloway proclaimed that the statute "is not novel ... but
declaratory of the common law."62 In Newell v. Meyendorff,6" the
case cited in Schwanekamp as proclaiming the common law in
Montana, the court explained that the rule of reason "embod[ied]
the modern doctrine, as held by the authorities" and required that:
"contracts in restraint of trade, generally, have been held to be
void; while those limited as to time or place or persons have been
regarded as valid, and duly enforce[able] ... where the contract is
neither injurious to the public nor the obligor, . . . then the law
makes an exception and declares the agreement valid . . . if the
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at -, 708 P.2d at 580.
60. O'Neill v. Ferraro, 182 Mont. 214, 596 P.2d 197 (1979).
61. Id. at 218-19, 596 P.2d at 199 (quoting Eldridge v. Johnston, 195 Or. 379, 403, 245
P.2d 239, 250 (1952)). See infra note 65.
62. Schwanekamp v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 44 Mont. 526, 533, 120 P. 806, 807
(1912).
63. 9 Mont. 254, 23 P. 333 (1890).
[Vol. 49
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contract is founded on valuable consideration, and a reasonable
ground of benefit to the other party, it is free from objection, and
may be enforced. '64
Although the court in Dobbins did not cite its earlier holdings
in Schwanekamp and Newell as authority for rejecting the strict
compliance rule of Madel, it expressed essentially the same doc-
trine in both O'Neill and Dobbins.6 However, in Dobbins, the
court may have made one noticeable modification to the tradi-
tional rule of reason.
In explaining and limiting its holding in Madel, the court as-
serted that the contract provision it considered in Madel was "in
effect, an absolute prohibition upon Madel's right to engage in the
business of selling insurance." 6 Furthermore, when distinguishing
the contractual provision in Dobbins from that in the Madel case,
the court referred to the provision in the contract in Madel as
"prohibit[ing] the defendant from engaging in ... [his] business. '67
When reconciling this characterization of the Madel restrictions
with its application, 6 one attribute giving rise to a restraint is dis-
cernible. The contract in Madel absolutely prohibited the em-
ployee from engaging in his trade with respect to only a portion of
customers within the market.69
If indeed the court drew the line of reasonableness and thus
enforceability of post-employment covenants to automatically ex-
clude any covenants similar to that construed in Madel, then in
Dobbins the court effectively amended the common-law rule of
reason. 7  Thus, under this theory, any contract that prohibits the
64. Newell, 9 Mont. at 260, 23 P. at 334 (citing Lawrence v. Barber, 10 Barb. 641;
Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157; Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64
(1873)).
65. The tests adopted by the court in Dobbins were originally derived from Cook v.
Johnson, 47 Conn. 175, 36 Am. Rep. 64 (1879) (considering the validity of a contractual
restraint ancillary to sale of a business). See Dobbins, - Mont. at __ , 708 P.2d at 580,
(quoting Eldridge v. Johnston, 195 Or. 379, 403, 245 P.2d 239, 250 (1952)).
66. Dobbins, - Mont. at - , 708 P.2d at 579. The contract provision read:
The Employee agrees and covenants that for a period of five (5) years after the
termination of this Agreement, he will not directly or indirectly own, manage, op-
erate, control, be employed by, or participate in or be connected in any manner
with the ownership, management, operation or control of any business which sells
. . . to any customer of Employer with whom the Employee has at any time had
any dealings on behalf of the Employer; contact or solicit any customers of the
Employer with whom the Employee has at any time had any dealings on behalf of
the Employer; or sell or deliver to any customer of the Employer any insurance
sold by Employee while an Employee of the Employer as set out in this contract.
67. Id.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 29 and 41.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 29 & 41.
70. At common law, restraints could absolutely prohibit practice of a trade as to any
1988]
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former employee from serving even one prospective customer
would be void as a per se restraint of trade.71
However, a more logical explanation of the court's classifica-
tion of the Madel contract as an absolute restraint on trade is that
the court merely restated what it considered to be its holding in
Made1.72 The court's summary of Madel supports this conclusion.
The court treated the Madel covenant as one that totally pre-
cluded the employee from soliciting business "in any manner" in
the entire Montana credit insurance market for a period of five
years.7 3 This interpretation reconciles with the balance of the deci-
sion where the court distinguished the Dobbins contract as one
that did not contain per se absolute prohibition terms such as that
in the Madel contract.7 ' Furthermore, it is unreasonable to con-
clude that the court would take great pains to lay down the three
tests constituting the rule of reason, without intending that the
tests be applied to all contracts, even those similar in terms to that
construed in Madel.7 5 Consequently, while support exists for the
contention that all constraints which absolutely restrain any trade
are void,76 the more logical approach would treat the court's refer-
ence to Madel as contemplating covenants acting to restrain trade
as to an entire market.7
V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DRAFTING AND LITIGATING RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
A review of the case law reveals four distinct exceptions to the
section 28-2-703 statutory prohibition against restraints on trade.
These exceptions include those found in sections 28-2-70478 and
segment of the market so long as the restrictions were reasonable. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
71. This would include customers of the former employer as well as prospective cus-
tomers within a geographic area.
72. Dobbins, - Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 579.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court's comparison of the Dobbins restraint to that in Madel was not done
on a point by point basis. Rather, the court recited its holding in Madel without applying
the rule of reason to the Madel covenant. Thus, when the court examined the Dobbins re-
straint pursuant to the rule of reason and proclaimed that the two provisions did not com-
pare, the court was treating the Madel covenant as a complete bar on access to the market
on which restraints were placed.
75. Application of the rule of reason to the facts in Madel may very well have led to
the same conclusion that the five year restriction as to 24 out of 158 potential customers was
unreasonable under the factors outlined in Dobbins.
76. Dobbins, - Mont. at - , 708 P.2d at 579.
77. Id. at __, 708 P.2d at 580.
78. See supra note 15 for text of statute.
[Vol. 49
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-705 7 of the Montana Code Annotated; protection of an em-
ployer's confidential information authorized by section 39-2-102 of
the Montana Code Annotated; and finally, those restraints allowed
by the reasonableness test expressed in Dobbins. However, special
caveats accompany reliance on each of these exceptions when
drafting or litigating post-employment restrictive covenants.
A. Statutory Exceptions
When attempting to rely on either section 28-2-704 or section
-705 of the Montana Code Annotated, practitioners should be cog-
nizant of the degree of restraint seemingly allowed under these two
exceptions. While these statutory exceptions primarily involve con-
tractual restraints following the dissolution of a partnership or sale
of goodwill of a business, situations conceivably may arise where
such a transaction may additionally include provisions for an em-
ployment relationship. Examples of such instances include: when a
partner is employed by the partnership, where a former partner is
employed by a partnership immediately following dissolution, or
where a former owner remains as an employee of the business sub-
sequent to its sale. When such a situation occurs, the central issue
is whether the contract is ancillary" to the dissolution of a part-
nership"l or sale of goodwill of a business.82 If the agreement is
found to be ancillary to a qualifying event, analysis would then
proceed to determine whether the terms sought to be enforced are
within the statutory limits.8 "
One apparent distinction between an express exception and
the Dobbins rule of reason is that the express exception allows for
79. See supra note 16 for text of statute.
80. Ancillary contracts must be incidental to a larger transaction that transfers a pro-
tectable interest. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 241(2) (1963).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-704 (1987). See supra note 15 for text of statute.
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-704 (1987). See supra note 15 for text of statute. Good-
will only attaches with actual ownership of the business. Where a stockholder only held
stock in a business, the corporation owned the business' goodwill; thus, a covenant not to
compete was ineffective as to the stockholder. Wylie v. Wylie Permanent Camping Co., 57
Mont. 115, 121, 187 P. 279, 218-82 (1920). But cf. Western Media, Inc. v. Merrick, -
Mont. -, -, 727 P.2d 547, 549 (1986) (Non-competitive covenant upheld because of-
ficer-stockholder held goodwill upon dissolution). Attempts to guise employment contracts
as a sale of goodwill have been resoundingly rejected by the courts. See, Comment, Mon-
tana's Law Regarding Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 30 MONT. L. REV. 185, 197 (1968)
(authored by Cain).
83. The court strictly construes the geographic limitations set forth in MONT. CODE
ANN. § 28-2-704 (1987). See Lar-Con Corp. v. Murman Properties, Ltd., 188 Mont. 183, 186,
612 P.2d 676, 678, (1980). Time limitations or other restrictions must be reasonable to qual-
ify under the statutory exceptions. See Jenson v. Olsen, 144 Mont. 224, 227, 395 P.2d 465,
467 (1964).
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protection within a geographical area, while under Dobbins the re-
strictive covenant may be limited to protecting particular custom-
ers.8 4 Thus, the employer may enjoy broader protection from a
statutory exception in a localized market. Additionally, if the rule
of reason dictates that any prohibition of a trade constitutes an
unenforceable restraint," then absent privileged information, 6 the
statutory exceptions provide the exclusive access to injunctive
relief.8 7
Practitioners should also consider reasonableness when evalu-
ating the enforceability of a provision initially authorized by the
statutory exception. The test for reasonableness of a covenant is
mainly raised when considering the duration of the covenant. 88
However, reasonableness of the degree of protection could conceiv-
ably become an issue if the employer attempted to apply both a
statutory exception as to geographical area coupled with a Dobbins
type provision as to particular clients. "
B. Confidential Information
An employer is afforded protection from disclosure or use by
an employee of information in which the employer has a property
interest.' 0 This protection is derived from section 39-2-102 of the
Montana Code Annotated, which reads: "[e]verything which an
employee acquires by virtue of his employment, except the com-
pensation, if any, which is due to him from his employer, belongs
to the latter, whether acquired lawfully or unlawfully or during or
after expiration of the term of his employment." 1 Thus, the pri-
mary criterion for invoking the confidential information excep-
84. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
87. Injunctive relief is available under this statute, Treasure Chem.,Inc. v. Team Lab-
oratory Chem. Corp., 187 Mont. 200, 202, 609 P.2d 285, 287 (1980). Damages may be sued
for under Leiman-Scott,Inc. v. Holmes, 142 Mont. 58, 61, 381 P.2d 489, 490 (1963).
88. See Jenson v. Olson, 144 Mont. 224, 395 P.2d 465, See generally Annotation, En-
forceability of Restrictive Covenant Ancillary to Employment Contract, as Affected by Du-
ration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955).
89. See, e.g., Jenson v. Olson, 144 Mont. 224, 395 P.2d 465 (1964). Conceivably the
court would look at the cumulative effect to determine whether the additional protection
would be reasonable. The primary concern would be whether the employer would be limited
to the so called reasonable boundaries of the statutory exceptions or rather would be able to
add the Dobbins protection in cases where such protection may be warranted.
90. Houchen, 152 Mont. at 198, 448 P.2d at 161. For a discussion of the types of infor-
mation giving rise to a property interest see Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete,
73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 667-72 (1960).
91. Houchen, 152 Mont. at 198, 448 P.2d at 161.
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tion"2 is whether the employer has a property right in the informa-
tion that the employee uses or discloses. Before recognizing an
employer's property right in any particular information a court
must first determine that the information was gained by the em-
ployee through a trust or confidence and that the information is of
a confidential nature.
When filing a complaint under section 39-2-102 of the Mon-
tana Code Annotated, practitioners should include allegations that
(1) the employer took reasonable steps to secret the information at
issue" and (2) that such information was confidential and not
readily accessible to the competition. 4 Employers must plead and
prove both allegations to avail themselves of the protection of this
statute. 5 In the absence of such proof, a former employee will be
free to use any information or knowledge gained during employ-
ment.98 The remedies available for an employee's breach of a rec-
ognized employer confidence include both damages and permanent
injunction. 7
C. Rule of Reason as Established in Dobbins
When considering the application of the rule of reason as an-
nounced by the court in Dobbins, practitioners should review the
92. Although the protection allowed an employer under MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-102
(1987) may be considered an exception to MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (1987), this is some-
what of a misnomer. Only in those instances where there is an employment contract con-
taining a covenant not to disclose does this exception apply. Compare Gould, 203 Mont.
217, 455 P.2d 451, with Houchen, 152 Mont. 194, 448 P.2d 158.
93. See Blake, supra note 90, at 673-74.
94. Houchen, 152 Mont. at 198, 448 P.2d at 161.
95. It is plaintiff's burden to prove that the information sought to be protected is of a
confidential nature and, in cases where there is a written contract containing a covenant not
to disclose, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the covenant does not violate MONT.
CODE ANN. § 28-2-703. However, the proof that the information is of a confidential nature
and has been secreted works to overcome both burdens. Gould, 203 Mont. at 222-23, 661
P.2d at 454.
96. Madel, 176 Mont. at 55, 575 P.2d at 1324.
97. Houchen, 152 Mont. at 196, 448 P.2d at 160. While MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-102
(1987) provides protection as to confidential information obtained pertaining to the needs
and or preferences of particular clients, no such safeguard is available to protect the good-
will associated with the customer relationship with the employee regardless of the resources
the employer may have invested to nurture such goodwill. See Mathews Paint Co. v. Seaside
Paint and Lacquer Co., 148 Cal. App.2d 168, 306 P.2d 113, 117 (1957) (cited with approval
in Madel) (Plaintiff spent many years developing a clientele but failed to allege that the
knowledge of former workers was confidential and the information was not readily accessible
to the competition. However, the goodwill associated with the employees was not at issue in
the case because the employer could not claim a property right in such goodwill). See Blake
supra note 90, at 670-71. (The covenant not to compete is available to protect the em-
ployer's investment in building a goodwill relationship between the employee and
customer).
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policies and historical background which color such an application.
The doctrine opposing restraint of trade dates back to eighteenth
century England.98 Courts of that era were faced with the task of
harmonizing the policy considerations supporting freedom to con-
tract versus the interest of society in reaping the economic utility
from members of that society functioning in positions where they
optimize their income and thus that of society." While the circum-
stances of life have vastly changed since the creation of the rule of
reason, courts continue to use the same formula to balance these
interests. 00 One primary concern today centers on the restraints
an employer may place on an employee to protect the employer's
interest in the goodwill in the relationship the employee has estab-
lished with customers.101
When applying the rule of reason, practitioners should remem-
ber that there is no set formula for finding any particular covenant
to be reasonable. 02 Each case must and will vary due to the differ-
ences in factual situations. a03 Therefore practitioners should be es-
pecially diligent in obtaining factual information.
After initially determining that the covenant is limited as to
time or place,'0 4 and is supported by valuable consideration,0 5 the
practitioner should examine relevant factors to determine if the
covenant is reasonable. The initial inquiry when determining the
reasonableness of a covenant is whether the employer's interests
receive only that degree of protection which is necessary to pre-
serve it.0 6 Recognized employer interests that reasonably warrant
protection include: trade secrets, confidential information and
goodwill associated with customer relations. 0 7 After identifying an
employer's protectable interest, the practitioner should evaluate it
by identifying the variables bearing on the value of the interest. 10 8
Finally, the practitioner should consider this value in light of the
98. See Newell, 9 Mont. at 259-60, 23 P. at 333; see also Blake, supra note 90, at 629.
99. Newell, 9 Mont. at 260-61, 23 P. at 333-34. For an in-depth explanation of the
development of this body of law, see Blake, supra note 90, at 627-46.
100. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
101. See Blake, supra note 90, at 647.
102. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 246 (1963).
103. Id.
104. Dobbins, - Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 580. See also 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 247
(1963).
105. Dobbins, - Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 580.
106. See Blake, supra note 90, at 648-49.
107. See generally Blake, supra note 90, at 653-74.
108. See Blake, supra note 90. These factors include, but are not limited to, the na-
ture of the contact with customers, the type of product sold, the time period required for
the employee to establish this relationship, nature of the business, and the investment the
employer has made in this particular interest.
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degree of protection that the employer seeks to enforce. 10 9 Exam-
ples of protection factors include: geographical area of the restric-
tion, restrictions as to service of particular customers, and duration
of the restraint. "The practitioner then must consider whether the
burden placed on the employee is reasonable.'11 Such a valuation is
accomplished by considering various factors pertinent to the em-
ployee's burden. These factors include the broadness of the restric-
tions; the length of time for which the employee has worked for the
employer; the length of time the employee would be barred from
competing with the employer; the narrowness of the prohibition;
and compensation, experience or training received during the term
of employment. 1 2 Additional factors pertinent to this determina-
tion are the circumstances leading to the termination of
employment. 1" 3
Policy considerations play a major role when attempting to de-
termine whether a particular restraint constitutes an unreasonable
burden on society."" The practitioner should be keenly aware of
society's distaste for both monopolies" 5 and unemployment." 6 Ap-
plying these factors, the practitioner should consider the size and
impact on a market, the aggregate cost to society, and other public
policies that are particular to a specific employment position or
activity.1 7
VI. CONCLUSION
The Dobbins decision represents a major milestone in the area
of post-employment restraints of trade. While the court seemingly
revitalized the common-law rule of reason, questions still remain as
to what constitutes a reasonable restraint. While some authority
109. See Blake, supra note 90, at 651. See also 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 246 (1963).
110. See generally Blake, supra note 90.
111. Dobbins, - Mont. at __, 708 P.2d at 580.
112. See Blake, supra note 90, at 684-86. See also 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 254 (1963).
113. Although the new wrongful discharge statute has not been tested in this area of
the law, it is questionable whether an employer could enforce such a covenant after violating
this act, codified as MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 through -914.
114. See Blake, supra note 90, at 686. See also 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 249 (1963).
115. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 250 (1963).
116. Newell, 9 Mont. at 260, 23 P. at 334. But see Blake, supra note 90, at 686-87.
117. See Blake, supra note 90, at 687. Many professional codes of conduct embody
such a "profession specific" public policy. For example, the professional code of conduct
governing the legal profession provides that: "A lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making ... a[n] ... employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice
after termination of the [employment] relationship, except an agreement concerning bene-
fits upon retirement .... " Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6(a) (1988). Where
these codes prohibit restrictions on competition, attempted violations have been held unen-
forceable. See, e.g., Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 68 Or. 700, 683 P.2d 563 (1984).
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supports the hairsplitting distinction that is drawn between reim-
bursing covenants and those that selectively prohibit competi-
tion,118 such artificial distinctions are not necessary. Language in
Dobbins supports the contention that all absolute restraints on any
trade are void, but the better rule contradicts such an assumption.
The rule of reason as enunciated by the court in Dobbins is centu-
ries old and yet flexible enough to address the demands of twenti-
eth century employment relationships. By weighing the interests of
all concerned parties to determine whether terms are reasonable,
society receives an economic windfall that remains unrealized.
By analyzing Dobbins in conjunction with previous Montana
decisions, the parameters of the exceptions to section 28-2-703 of
the Montana Code Annotated can be drawn. While many issues
remain to be resolved, the practitioner should be aware of the op-
portunities afforded by the Dobbins exception.
118. See Annotation, Covenants to Reimburse Former Employer For Lost Business,
52 A.L.R. 139, 143 (1987).
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